Abstract. We report quantitative relations between corruption level and economic factors, such as country wealth and foreign investment per capita, which are characterized by a power law spanning multiple scales of wealth and investments per capita. These relations hold for diverse countries, and also remain stable over different time periods. We also observe a negative correlation between level of corruption and long-term economic growth. We find similar results for two independent indices of corruption, suggesting that the relation between corruption and wealth does not depend on the specific measure of corruption. The functional relations we report have implications when assessing the relative level of corruption for two countries with comparable wealth, and for quantifying the impact of corruption on economic growth and foreign investments. 
Introduction
Corruption influences important aspects of social and economic life. The level of corruption in a given country is widely believed to be an important factor to consider when projecting economic growth, estimating the effectiveness of the government administration, making decisions for strategic investments, and forming international policies.
The relation between corruption level and key parameters of economic performance is largely qualitative [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] . Corruption has become increasingly important Please give a shorter version with: \authorrunning and \titlerunning prior to \maketitle 3 with the globalization of the international economic and political relations between countries, which has led various governmental and non-governmental organizations to search for adequate measures to quantify levels of corruption [1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12] .
Systematic studies of corruption have been hampered because of the complexity and secretive nature of corruption, making it difficult to quantify. There have been concerted efforts to introduce quantitative measures suitable for describing levels of corruption across diverse countries [13, 14, 15] . However, a specific functional dependence between quantitative measures of corruption and economic performance has not been established.
Previous studies have suggested a negative association between corruption level and country wealth [1, 2, 3] .
There is active debate concerning the relation between corruption level and economic growth [16, 17] . Some earlier studies suggest that corruption may help the most efficient firms bypass bureaucratic obstacles and rigid laws [4, 5] leading to a positive effect on economic growth, while more recent works do not find a significant negative dependence between corruption and growth [1, 2] . Further, studies of net flow of foreign investment report conflicting results. Some studies find no significant correlation between inward foreign investment and corruption level in host countries [6, 7] , while others indicate a negative association between corruption and foreign investments [2, 8] .
This debate reflects the inherent complexity of the problem as countries in the world vary dramatically in their social and economic development [18] . Thus, an open question remains whether there is a general functional relation between corruption level and key aspects of the economic performance of different countries.
We develop and test the hypothesis that there may be a power-law dependence between corruption level and economic performance which holds across diverse countries regardless of differences in specific country characteristics such as country wealth (defined in our paper as gross domestic product per capita) or foreign direct investment.
Recent studies show that diverse social and economic systems exhibit scale invariant behavior -e.g., size ranking and growth of firms, universities, urban centers, countries and even people's personal fortunes follow a power law over a broad range of scales [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] . Since countries in the world greatly differ in their wealth and foreign investments, we test the possibility that there may be an underlying organization, such that the cross-country relations between corruption level and country wealth, and corruption level and foreign investments exhibit a significant negative correlation characterized by scale-invariant properties over multiple scales, and thus they can be described by power laws. Specifically, we test if this scale-invariant behavior remains stable over different time periods, as well as its validity for different subgroups of countries. Finally, we demonstrate a strong correlation between corruption level and past long-term economic growth. 
Data and Methods
We analyze the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) [14, 27] introduced by Transparency International [14] , a global civil organization supported by a wide network of government agencies, developmental organizations, foundations, public institutions, the private sector, and individuals.
The CPI is a composite index based on independent surveys of business people and on assessments of corruption in different countries provided by more than ten independent institutions around the world, including the World Economic Forum, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the International Institute for Management Development [27] . The We also analyze a different measure of corruption, the Control of Corruption Index (CCI) [9, 15] provided by the World Bank [15] . The CCI ranges from -2.5 to 2. [30] holds U.S. companies legally liable for bribing foreign government officials, which makes the U.S. a source country which penalizes its multinational companies for corruption practices [8] . To test if there is a common functional dependence between corruption level and country wealth, we plot the CPI versus gdp for different countries [ Fig. 1(a-e) ]. We find a positive correlation between CPI and country wealth, which can be well approximated by a power law
where µ > 0, indicating that richer countries are less cor- Depending whether a specific country is above (e.g., Bulgaria) or below (e.g., Romania) the power-law fit, one can assess if this country is less (or more) corrupt relative to the average level of corruption corresponding to the wealth of this country.
Moreover, the quantitative dependence we find in Eq. by similar values of the exponent µ for different years and different number of countries. The power-law fit indicates the expected level of corruption expected for given country wealth. Note that, comparing two countries with a similar gdp, the country placed above the power-law fit is less corrupt than one would expect for its level of wealth, while the country below the power-law curve has a relatively higher level of corruption than one would expect for its wealth. (f) We obtain similar results for the adjusted control of corruption index CCI ad [15] , which is independent of CPI, indicating that the scale-invariant relation between corruption and wealth does not depend on the specific measure of corruption. Vertical dashed lines in the panels seperate the top 30 wealthiest countries. (see Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 ) Please give a shorter version with: \authorrunning and \titlerunning prior to \maketitle 7 ∆=0.02 is the standard deviation. For the CPI and gdp data we find an average correlation coefficient of 0.86. We also note that the inverse relation of gdp as a function of CPI is characterized by an exponentμ which is not equal to 1/µ as one might expect, since the correlation coefficient of the data fit is less than 1. Next, we analyze data comprising the same set of countries for different years 
Given the facts that (i) the number of countries we
analyze changes from 90 to 153, and (ii) that the time horizon of 5-6 years we consider could be sufficient for significant changes in both corruption level and wealth (e.g., the case of Eastern European countries), our finding of a power-law relationship in Eq. (1) is consistent with a universal dependence between gdp and CPI across diverse countries. We note that the power-law relation in Eq. (1) holds when gdp is calculated both as current prices in US dollars [ Fig. 1 and Fig. 2] , as well as the value based on purchasing power parity [ Fig. 4 ]. Further, Eq. (1) implies that lowering the corruption level of a country would lead to an increase in its gdp and vice versa-e.g., for a country with gdp ≈ $4000 an increase in CPI of 0.25 units would lead to increase in the gdp of approximately $700 [ Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 ]. terizing the relation between CPI and gdp remains relatively stable over the considered period. As rich countries have a relatively higher gdp growth rate compared to poor countries (see Fig. 8 below) , and because CPI is defined in a bounded interval, we expect the value of the exponent µ to decrease slightly with time when considering time horizons larger than a decade.
To confirm that our findings do not depend on the specific choice of the measure of corruption, we repeat our analysis for a different index, the CCI [9, 15] . As the CCI is defined in the interval [-2.5, 2.5] we use a linear transformation to obtain the adjusted CCI, CCI ad ≡ 2 × (CCI + 2.5), so that both CCI ad and CPI are defined in the same interval from 0 to 10. We find that CCI ad also exhibits a power-law behavior as a function of gdp with a similar value of the power-law exponent µ as obtained for CPI [ Fig. 1(f) ]. So, the specific interval in which the (1) is not an artifact of subjective evaluation of cor- Please give a shorter version with: \authorrunning and \titlerunning prior to \maketitle 9 ruption. In summary, our empirical results indicate that the power-law relation between corruption and gdp across countries does not depend on the specific subset of chosen countries (provided they span a broad range of gdp), does not depend on the specific measure of corruption (CPI and CCI), and does not change significantly over time horizons shorter than a decade.
Corruption Level and Country Wealth Rank
Curves.
We next rank countries by their gdp and by their CPI. We find that gdp versus rank exhibits an exponential behavior for countries with rank larger than 30, and a pronounced crossover to a power-law behavior for the wealthiest 30 countries [ Fig. 5 ]. We further find that the shape of gdp versus rank curve remains unchanged for different years, and that increasing the number of countries we consider only extends the range of the exponential tail. Our findings for the shape of the gdp versus rank curve differ from earlier reports [31, 32] . We find that the CPI versus rank curve exhibits a behavior similarly to that of the gdp versus rank curve, with a crossover from a power law to an exponential tail for countries with rank larger than 30.
The shape of the CPI versus rank curve also remains unchanged when we repeat the analysis for different years [ Fig. 6 ]. We find that the ranking of countries based on gdp practically matches the ranking based on the CPI index. This is evidence of a strong and positive correlation between the ranking of wealth and the ranking of corruption. Since the gdp rank is an unambiguous result of an objective quantitative measure, the evidence of a strong correlation of the CPI rank with the gdp rank we observe in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 indicates that the CPI values are not subjective, and that our finding of a power-law relation between CPI and gdp in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 is not an artifact of an arbitrary scale imposed on the CPI or on the CCI.
Further, we compare the values of the decay parameters ζ CP I and ζ gdp characterizing the exponential behavior of the CPI and gdp rank curves,
and
where R CP I and R gdp index the rank order of CPI and gdp respectively.
We find that for each year the ratio ζ CP I /ζ gdp reproduces the value of the power-law exponent µ defined in Eq. (1) for the same year -an insightful result since it would hold only when R CP I is similar to R gdp . Indeed, only when R CP I ≈ R gdp we obtain from Eq. (2) and Eq.
(3) the relation between log(CPI) and log(gdp),
Combining Eq. (1) and Eq. (4), we see that
Thus, for each year the power-law dependence between CPI and gdp in Eq. (1) is directly related to the exponential behavior of the CPI and gdp versus rank [Eq. (2) and Eq. (3)]. We note that this relation does not hold for the top 30 wealthiest countries, for which there is an enhanced economic interaction in a globalization sense, perhaps leading to similarities in development patterns and overall decrease in the gdp growth difference [33, 34] 
Relation Between Corruption Level and Foreign
Direct Investment.
We next investigate how the corruption level relates to foreign direct investment. We consider the amount of in- . We find a strong dependence of the amount of U.S. direct investments in a given country on the corruption level in that country [ Fig. 7] . Specifically, we find that the functional dependence between U.S. direct investments per capita, I, and the corruption levels across countries exhibits scale-invariant behavior characterized by a power law ranging over at least a factor of 10 3 [ Fig. 7 ]
We find that less corrupt countries have received more U.S. investment per capita, and that Eq. (6) also holds for different years. In particular, we find that groups of countries from different continents, which differ in both gdp and average CPI, are characterized by different values of λ [ Fig. 7] . We obtain similar results when repeating our analysis for the CCI, suggesting that the power-law relation in Eq. (6) American firms from entering corruption deals, but does not dictate in which country and how much money the American firms should invest. Therefore, the statistical regularities we find in Fig. 7 cannot arise from legislatory measures against foreign corruption.
Relation Between Corruption Level and Growth
Rate.
Finally, we investigate whether there is a relation between corruption level and long-term growth rate. Since the CPI reflects the quality of governing and administration in a given country, which traditionally requires considerable time to change, we hypothesize that there may be relation between the current corruption level of a country and its growth rate over a wide range of time horizons. To test this hypothesis we estimate the long-term growth rate for each country as the slope of the least square fit to the plot of log(gdp) versus year over the past several decades, where the gdp is taken as constant prices in national currency shown also in Fig. 1) , characterized by the exponential decay constant ζ gdp . Log-log plots of the ranking curves (shown in the insets) indicate a crossover from an exponential to a power-law behaviour for the top 30 wealthiest countries. We note that the top 30 wealthiest countries cluster above the fitting curves in Fig. 1, Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 . Fig. 1 and Fig. 5 ), characterized by the exponential decay constant ζCP I . The ratio ζCP I /ζ gdp consistently reproduces the value of the power-law exponent µ in Fig. 1(a) -Fig. 1(d) for each corresponding year and each group of countries. This indicates that a necessary condition for the power-law relation between CPI and GDP per capita is that the GDP per capita rank order of countries is similar to the rank order based on CPI. Log-log plots of the ranking curves (shown in the insets) indicate a crossover from an exponential to a power-law behaviour for the top 30 least corrupt countries, similar to the cross over behaviour observed for gdp in Fig. 5 . as well as when considering corruption in the context of certain cultural norms [39] . 
